Opinion polling in Central and Eastern Europe under communism by Henn, M
 1 
 
 
 
1 
 
OPINION POLLING IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE UNDER 
COMMUNISM 
 
Matt Henn 
 
DOI: 10.1177/002200949803300203 
Journal of Contemporary History, 1998 Vol.33 (2): 229-240 
The online version of this article can be found at: 
http://jch.sagepub.com/content/33/2/229.citation 
 
  
 
Whilst political opinion polling occupies a well-entrenched position within 
contemporary capitalist political systems, the same cannot be said for the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe.  This paper focuses primarily on the development of political 
opinion polling in these countries in the period prior to the collapse of communist regimes 
there at the end of 1989.  Polling was a feature of these communist-led societies, although 
it was limited in terms of its activities, the scope of issue coverage, and its ability to 
measure public opinion effectively. The major focus of the discussion concentrates on 
the methodological issues and problems confronting opinion pollsters in these societies 
during this time.  
 
The Development of Opinion Polling Under Communism 
Although it is generally recognized that public opinion polls were not carried out in the 
Soviet Union and other Central and East European countries until the 1950s1, 
documentary evidence does exist which suggests that polling activities can be traced as 
far back as 1945 in both Hungary2 and in Czechoslovakia.3  For instance, the Hungarian 
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Institute of Public Opinion Research (HIPOR) was set up in August 1945, as a branch of 
the Hungarian Press Agency, ‘...organized after the manner of the American Institute of 
Public opinion’.4  It conducted research into how public opinion reacted to a variety of 
political events and issues, and how it perceived political parties, leaders, policies and 
programmes.  At the general election in 1945, it accurately forecast the levels of support 
for the five main parties with an average error of less than 2% per party. 
 In the immediate aftermath of the Second-World War, the liberation from Nazi 
occupation in Czechoslovakia ushered in a series of conditions necessary for the 
establishment of opinion polling in any country.  These conditions were:  
the emergence of an open and competitive party system;  
the freedom to express opinions without fear of retribution;  
relatively unobstructed information diffusion within society;  
and a necessity for political elites to establish lines of communication with the mass 
citizenry. 
 
 As a consequence of these developments, the Czechoslovak Institute of Public 
Opinion Research (Ceskoslovensky Ustav Pro Vyzkum Verejneho Mineni, hereafter 
UVVM) , was set up at the end of 1945 as an independent research organization.  The 
formal operating policy of UVVM was that it should gauge public opinion on political, 
social and economic issues, to provide the raw material through which policy-makers 
could identify the needs and aspirations of the citizenry, and legislate accordingly.  
Furthermore, all surveys were to be conducted in the public interest, rather than for any 
sectional or partisan advantage.  As its founder members explained, one key objective of 
the polling institute was that there should ‘...be no alliance with any particular political 
party, and no propaganda for any particular ideology’.5  In this early period, the opinion 
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pollsters in Czechoslovakia operated with a fair degree of autonomy from the state, and 
their (predominantly governmental) sponsors.  There was little governmental 
intervention in, or censure of UVVM’s polling activities, and the polling institute was 
relatively free to conduct research into any area of politics, economics, society or culture.  
Furthermore the data was publicly available in the monthly journal Verejne Mineni 
(Public Opinion).  In its first year, UVVM conducted polls which were designed to help 
the reconstruction of political structures and apparatus after the period of repression, and 
the suspension of democracy which had characterized German occupation between 1939 
and 1945.  The public was asked to consider the most effective methods for reorganizing 
the administrative mechanisms at local, district and provincial level and their reactions 
to plans for curbing the influence of the traditional state structures, and of broadening the 
powers of elected representatives in the newly established National Committees.  
Furthermore, the polls sought to identify which further reforms could be implemented to 
democratize the political system.  The leaders of the Czechoslovak resistance movement 
had agreed upon a joint Government Programme at Kosice during the final phase of the 
country’s liberation, which formalized the political structure of the new state, and 
guaranteed representation in government of all political parties.  This programme for 
political reconstruction was accompanied by the Two Year Plan, a blue-print for 
economic rehabilitation.  The polls monitored the public’s awareness of, and reactions to 
these programmes, together with their perception of the government’s performance, and 
the popularity of ministers and party leaders.6 
 UVVM also conducted a pre-election poll for the May 1946 general election.  
During this period, there was ‘limited’ political pluralism - before the German invasion, 
there were approximately thirty political parties in Czechoslovakia, but after the war, 
there were only eight (four in Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia, and four in Slovakia).  The 
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union of five of these parties formed the National Front, a grand coalition government 
with no legitimate opposition.  At the election, the Communist Party secured 40% of the 
votes and 114 of the 300 seats.  With the support of the Social Democrats, they mustered 
a majority in Parliament, and were invited by President Benes to form a government.  
The performance of UVVM in accurately forecasting the outcome of the election to within 
1.1% of the final results was an indication to the public and to policy-makers alike, of the 
ability, effectiveness and validity of polls in measuring public.  The success of UVVM at 
the election led to a proliferation of political opinion polling by the institute. 
 In February 1948, the coalition government was replaced by a government 
composed of members of the Communist Party and its supporters from other parties.  
Elections were then proposed for May of that year, and Gottwald pronounced that the 
Party would secure the largest share of votes, and that this would signal majority support 
for their plans to revolutionize Czechoslovakian life.  UVVM organized three pre-election 
polls to test the levels of support for the parties, and to forecast the likely outcome of the 
election.  However, after the questionnaires from the first wave of the survey were 
collected, they were confiscated by government officials.  Nonetheless, they had already 
been processed by hand, and a visiting American journalist learned that the results 
suggested that the Communist Party would gain only about 30% of the votes cast at the 
forthcoming election, much less than the 40% achieved at the election in 1946.7  Such a 
finding might have had a damaging effect on the Communist Party, calling into question 
their claims to represent the mass of the populace, and undermining their ambitions for 
constructing a new state and society based on the Stalinist-model which had developed 
in the Soviet Union.  The view held by the new communist-led government of polling 
was one of suspicion: the prospect of an independent opinion polling institution, 
publishing findings which ran contrary to the propaganda of the Party, and which denied 
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the alleged consensus of public support for the values and aims of Marxism-Leninism, 
was perceived by the party leadership as intolerable.8  Furthermore, the polling 
methodologies had been imported by Adamec and Viden from the USA, when they 
visited Albert Cantrill and George Gallup shortly after the war.  The methodologies they 
used when they returned were a  direct reflection of those employed by the pollsters in 
capitalist countries.  Samples were generated using a quota method (based on gender, 
age, social class, community size and geographical distribution); personal interviews 
were conducted with structured questionnaires.9  In a period of mutual suspicion between 
the Western capitalist bloc, and the new communist-led countries, it was perhaps not 
surprising that the authorities were critical of opinion polling activities. 
 As a consequence, the period after the ascendance to political power of the 
Communist Party in February 1948, was one of repression for opinion polling in 
Czechoslovakia.  UVVM was permitted to continue its activities for a further two years 
but only after it had been reorganized, and only in the context of enquiring into non-
political issues.  The chief editor of Verejne Mineni was forced to leave the building 
immediately the Communist Party had assumed control of the government, and the 
journal was closed down.  The institute’s entire personnel, none of them members of the 
Communist Party, were sacked; one founder-member, Cenek Adamec, was imprisoned, 
and later forced to work in a factory.  The combination of these events led ultimately to 
the gradual disappearance of Czechoslovakian opinion polling.10 
 In fact, public opinion research was also largely perceived as an irrelevant activity 
within the communist-led countries.  In the Soviet Union for instance, under Stalin’s 
leadership, “...the instruments by which public opinion was discovered included the 
secret police, the party apparatus...letters to the mass media, and ‘self-criticism’”.11 
Worcester observes that, between ‘...1930 and the mid-1950s, the Soviet leadership 
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tended to assume that party cadres, aided by KGB sources and informants, knew what 
needed to be known about the citizenry’s needs, attitudes and preferences’.12  
Furthermore, independent opinion polls which were geared towards reporting the 
publics’ rating of the performance of the Party, and of the Party leaderships, and which 
sought to measure satisfaction levels with policy proposals and outcomes, were viewed 
by the party hierarchies as unnecessary.  Stanislaw Kwiatkowski, former Central 
Committee member of the Polish Communist Party, and chief political (and polling) 
advisor to General Jaruzelski claims that:  
 
 ‘The picture of a differentiated society that emerged from the public opinion research did 
not fit the thesis on the moral and political unity of the nation obligatory at that time’.13 
 
Communist governments throughout Central and Eastern Europe took a rather dim view 
of Social Science generally, and of social research methods and opinion polling.  As a 
leading Polish opinion pollster during the communist reign in Poland during the 1980s, 
Piotr Kwiatkowski notes: 
 
 “During the Stalinist period, every attempt to express independent opinion on social or 
political issues was brutally suppressed.  The notion of public opinion was officially 
condemned and sociology was banned from the universities of all communist countries 
as a Western ‘pseudo-science’”.14 
 
 However, a large number of Central and East European countries had strong, 
established traditions in sociology that pre-dated the communist era.  In Poland, Bulgaria, 
Yugoslavia, Russia, Czechoslovakia and Romania, sociology emerged in the latter half 
of the 1800s as a social protest, rather than a purely academic discipline - indeed the 
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absence of any official Hungarian sociology at this time has been ascribed to its 
association by governments with political radicalism and with socialist-inspired anti-
establishment protests.  Many early prominent sociologists in the region then were 
progressive, often socialist activists, who ‘...combined their sociological studies with an 
active engagement in various struggles for social justice, democratic freedom and 
national independence’.15  After the victory of the October revolution in 1917, sociology 
in the USSR become concerned with the study of the emerging socialist society and 
consequently, it was officially perceived as a method for understanding and contributing 
to the human condition; this was considered as serving a more useful purpose than the 
objectives of those who held a more traditional, humanistic view of sociology as the 
accumulation of knowledge for knowledge’s sake.  In this latter context, objective, 
empirical sociological research was seen as alienated from the problems of human 
society by communist leaderships, and was irrelevant in the struggle for constructing an 
international socialist community.16 
 With the political ascendancy of the Stalinist bureaucracies, sociological 
research, with the exception of the official Marxist-Leninist approach, was virtually non-
existent up until the end of the 1950s.  Empirical-quantitative studies of society and 
politics were criticized because they were identified with a broadly Western, chiefly 
American orientation to the study of society.  Attila notes that, as a consequence: 
 ‘Political science did not simply disappear after a small period of emergence and early 
successes in democratization (1944-48) but it was banned as a pseudo-science of the 
bourgeoisie - an autocratic rule does not need the science of Democracy’.17 
 
The suppression of sociology then, in the period up until the end of the 1950s in Central 
and East European communist political systems was a function of the political 
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leaderships’ view of it as ‘bourgeois politology’, and ‘reactionary political science’, and 
as a threat to communist hegemony.18   
 In the light of these discussions, it is not surprising that the early communist 
regimes demonstrated little enthusiasm for opinion polling.  However, there is some 
evidence of polling taking place in communist-led societies, although these polling 
institutes were usually set up, financed, controlled, and accountable to the ruling Party.  
When attempts were made to reassess the nature of society and encourage political 
debate, sociology and ultimately opinion polls were endorsed.  Shlapentokh characterizes 
this relationship between the State, Party and social science-based research as one in 
which political-environmental factors were paramount.  Thus, in periods of Stalinist 
ascendency, sociology and hence social and political research were largely repressed, and 
in reform periods, such as the ‘golden age’ of Soviet sociology (1965-72) and later, at the 
end of the 1980s, controls and censorship were relaxed, and in many communist political 
systems, institutions were set up to explore sensitive, often ‘political’ issues.  Hence, 
when Nikita Khrushchev assumed the leadership of the Soviet Union, sociology was 
rehabilitated; in 1960, Boris Grushin, one of the founders of Soviet sociology established 
the Institute of Public Opinion, based at the newspaper Komsomol’skaia pravda, and in 
1961 the Party leadership endorsed the founding of a section for sociological research at 
the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy.  Generally, the areas for research 
were largely restricted to social and economic issues concerned with work, family life 
and living standards.  However, between 1965 and 1972, the research began to 
investigate political and current affairs issues - an unprecedented development in the 
direction of Soviet sociology.  In 1968, the Institute for Concrete Social research was 
endorsed by the Politburo of the CPSU, and was involved in conducting a series of 
projects within the ‘political’ realm of Soviet life.  However, the political repercussions 
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of the Prague Spring had a significant impact on the activities of this  and other social 
and political research centres.  It precipitated a crisis of confidence amongst the Soviet 
leadership, which then embarked upon a generalized campaign of political repression 
aimed at ‘intellectuals’, and their most visible manifestation, empirical sociologists.  In 
1971, the CPSU sanctioned a large scale purge of the Institute for Concrete Social 
Research, and its polling branch, the Centre for the Study of Public Opinion was closed. 
19 However, during the 1980s, the communist leaderships in the Soviet Union gradually 
warmed to the idea of conducting and publishing opinion polls, although early studies 
were limited in scope of issues covered: in 1983, the Soviet leader Yuri Andropov 
announced that a national institute of public opinion would be formed to cover  the entire 
USSR.20  Slider observes that the rationale was based upon the experiences of a public 
opinion centre created by the Georgian Communist Party.  There, the reform-minded 
Shevardnadze frequently cited polls as an aid to policy-making and agenda-setting.21 As 
a result of Mikhail Gorbachev’s ‘Glasnost’ and ‘Perestroika’ programmes, such centres 
were actually established the following year.22  The development of these polling centres 
is explained by Valery Korobeinikov in terms of the role that they could take for the 
government in initiating and extending the processes of political democratization.  In the 
first instance, he observes that the spirit of public opinion research was written into the 
Soviet constitution of 1977, which stated that the extension of socialist democracy is 
closely connected with ‘...greater openness and publicity, and constant responsiveness to 
public opinion’.23  Secondly in a more concrete sense, polls assisted politicians by 
identifying public attitudes to reform; they provided feedback from citizens in relation to 
government plans, and therefore assisted policy-formulation and implementation.  On 
political reform, public opinion polls were conducted to help clarify voters’ attitudes to 
innovations in the electoral system (particularly the secret ballot) and the nomination of 
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party candidates.24  Finally, Korobeinikov argues that polls were utilized by the ruling 
Communist Party ‘...to improve the work of the various party committees’.  Thus, two 
republic-wide polls were conducted in Georgia in late 1986 where ‘...respondents were 
given the opportunity to evaluate the activities of all governing bodies in the 
republic...[and to] indicate problems caused by Cadre policies simply seen as incorrect’.25  
Polling institutes were established in many other Central and East European countries 
during the communist era, including for instance Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria.26   
 Many of these polls were limited in terms of their ability to provide accurate 
representations of public opinion.  White et al for instance describe the nation-wide 
network of polling centres established by Zaslavskaya in 1988 across the Soviet Union 
(VtsIOM) and comment upon their general unreliability, and large margins of error.  
Sample sizes were not sufficient to account for the population diversity, and extreme 
regional variation undermined the efficacy of polls in providing typical national pictures 
of public opinion.  Furthermore, certain groups were over-represented - including ethnic 
Russians, urban respondents, and those in the larger settlements - which inevitably 
reinforced the sample bias.  Data was usually aggregated, so that differences in response 
across key variables such as gender, age, nationality and social group could not be 
identified, and temporal comparisons were unachievable because of the lack of question-
wording consistency across polls.27  This raises a key issue when describing the 
development of polling in communist societies: methodological limitations of polling 
organizations in seeking to measure public opinion.  This is discussed below in relation 
to Polish polling experiences, which raises general issues which can be applied to other 
communist contexts. 
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Methods and Issues In Polling Communist Political Systems 
 Political opinion polls conducted in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
had their methodological origins in the USA and Western Europe.28  Prior to the Second 
World War, most sociological research was qualitative-based29, but the new techniques 
imported from the West employed the survey-sample method.  The following discussion 
focuses on various issues which emerged as researchers under the direction of Stephan 
Nowak and Zygmunt Gostkowski attempted to apply American political science 
techniques to Poland.  It suggests that there are certain key methodological problems in 
polling public opinion which are common in all communist political systems30, and 
which are linked to the social and political context of questionnaire interviewing.  These 
include: the levels of non-response in such political surveys; the problems associated with 
‘don’t know’ responses; and the influence of third parties in the interview process, 
together with the context of the interview. 
 
The Interview Situation and Non-response 
 It is possible to differentiate two official models of the interview situation and the 
role of the respondent, which pertain in capitalist and in communist societies.31  The first 
model assumes that in countries like America and Britain, the respondent is strongly 
motivated towards providing ‘true’ answers, and this derives from a belief in the 
usefulness of social studies and of the expression of one’s own opinions. This model can 
be challenged in the light of recent empirical evidence, especially in relation to the British 
general election polls in 199232.  A second model, developed by various sociologists in 
communist-led countries, assumes that the respondent has a positive attitude towards the 
interview, and is prepared to express his, or her ‘real’ opinions, since social research 
contributes to the solution of social problems.  It is claimed that the interview unites both 
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the researcher and the respondent as partners in their efforts to improve social life.  Both 
approaches focus on the attitudes of a ‘model citizen’, and a resultant uncritical 
perception of the purposes of social research. 
 However, the findings of researchers at The Polish Academy of Sciences Institute 
of Philosophy and Sociology (hereafter IFiS) suggest that neither model is applicable to 
Poland under conditions of communist rule.  They maintain that the public closely 
associated ‘...sociology, and social and political research with the state, its institutions, 
and the system of political power’.33  Social surveys and political opinion polls were 
perceived to be linked to governments’ propaganda strategies - part of a process whereby 
public opinion data was collected, and then manipulated and reported in such a way as to 
disseminate information publicly purporting to demonstrate universal support for the 
government, and the principles and programme of Marxism-Leninism.34  There was little 
sense that polls could help either to facilitate beneficial changes within society and for 
individuals generally, or that such data was taken into account in formulating and 
implementing policies.  Such polls were therefore observed with a large degree of 
ambivalence and scepticism by the public.35 
 A common view identified amongst the public was that polling research was 
state-sponsored in order to monitor citizens’ loyalty to the government, and control their 
consciousness.  As such, many people were reported by IFiS to be afraid of revealing any 
opinions which might in some way incriminate them, or lead to retribution from the state.  
The granting of an interview often requires therefore a suppression of fear and 
apprehension.  On the basis of these findings, it is surprising then that people took part in 
opinion polls at all in communist political systems.  Indeed, Lutynska reports that at the 
end of the 1970s, the refusal rate in surveys conducted by OBOP in Poland was only 
about 12%.36  This apparent contradiction is explained in terms of two major factors.  
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Firstly, respondents’ behaviour is governed by a traditional, and deeply internalized 
cultural norm requiring them to be hospitable to people, including strangers.  This 
accounts both for people inviting interviewers into their homes, and for volunteering to 
take part in political surveys.  Secondly, the interviewer is usually treated as a 
representative of a state agency, which forms part of the dominant power system. It is 
thus possible that ‘...fear of running into troubles or of being called to account for a refusal 
of interview dominates over the feeling of apprehension resulting from participation in 
the interview’.37 
 The publics’ reaction to opinion polling was however dependent on the political 
climate at the time of interview.  Przybylowska and Kistelski observe that during the 
reform period under Wladyslaw Gomulka in October 1956: 
 
 ‘...a hope for changes in the execution of political power and prospects for gradual 
democratization of social life and for free expression contributed to, and facilitated the 
introduction of opinion polls’.38 
 
 However, the introduction of Martial Law in December 1981 effectively stifled 
spontaneous and open expression of social and political opinions.  Indeed, by 1982 ‘...the 
question was even raised whether it made any sense to conduct questionnaire surveys in 
Poland... [because of] concern about refusal to take part in questionnaire surveys’.39  
Refusal rates were often recorded between 40% and 50% during this period, and these 
varied according to socio-economic and demographic status, and between regions and 
cities.  Ultimately, sample-surveys were often biased under Martial Law conditions.  A 
number of factors have been identified which help to explain both these low levels of 
response, and of response variation.  Lutynska claims that sponsorship of the research 
tended to make a significant impact here.  The highest rate of refusals occurred in polls 
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conducted by state-controlled organizations (OBP 28-50%, CBOS 23-44%, OBOP 16-
28), whilst in academic surveys non-response ranged between only 3% and 4%.  
Furthermore, the name of the research centre may also influence respondents’ 
willingness to take part in such research.  A common problem for the Centre for Press 
Research (OBP) was that they were associated with newspapers which had a low 
credibility rating amongst large sections of the public: ‘...people do not want to speak 
with representatives of the press, since they fear that their answers will be twisted, passed 
on to non-academic centres, or may be used for propaganda purposes contrary with their 
own beliefs’.40  The subject of the research also played a significant role in reducing the 
levels of public participation in polls - especially politically sensitive topics.  When 
combined with the effects of other factors such as sponsor of the poll, political context in 
which it was conducted, and generalized public concern for lack of anonymity in such 
surveys, this was seen as a major impediment to the achievement of representative polls.  
Finally, interviews were often associated with government officials, the police and 
security services, and activists of the ruling Communist Party (the PUWP); in the context 
of Martial Law, the fear of retribution from the state for criticizing the authorities and the 
principles of Marxism-Leninism in polls was greater than in other periods of communist 
rule.41 
 
The Incidence of ‘Don’t Know’ Responses 
 During the Martial Law period, respondents in opinion polls were likely to 
exercise some discretion in answering questions on politically sensitive topics by 
registering ‘don’t know’ responses where they felt that the expression of their views 
might lead to some punitive action by the authorities.  The use of such replies was 
therefore a means through which people could disguise their non-response in polls.  
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Lutynska’s research has found that during the period 1980-1985, the number of such 
replies trebled for questions which were ‘easy but sensitive’; she claims that question 
sensitivity was a more important factor than question complexity, or lack of knowledge 
about the issue polled.42  Kwiatkowski reports that the incidence of such responses were 
variable, particularly marked in terms of educational level, and influenced by the 
‘sponsorship’ factor:  respondents were more likely to answer ‘don’t know’ to politically-
sensitive questions polled by the state-controlled institute CBOS, than by the academic 
IFiS.43  This suggests that the reliability of many political opinion polls - particularly 
those conducted by state-owned and controlled agencies - and the validity of the data 
collected was extremely limited in communist political systems. 
 
The Presence of Third Persons in Interviews 
 Research at IFiS has also revealed that the presence or absence in the course of 
an opinion poll interview of third parties will have a major impact on the reliability of 
the data collected.  This will be further complicated by the context in which the interview 
is conducted.44  In the first instance, Lutynska reports that in a series of survey-
experiments between 1966 and 1968, the percentage of interviews in which third persons 
took part ranged between 27.4% and 63.7%, depending on the research topic; the average 
rate was 46.1%.  This factor was accountable for a difference in respondents’ expressed 
answers by up to a margin of 20.1%.  Furthermore, such situations tended to vary 
according to various social and spatial milieus, which suggests that the results obtained 
in any such research were likely to be skewed.  Third persons were also likely to 
participate as ‘active respondents’, rather than passive listeners in the polls: 
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 ‘...the respondents may be reminded of certain facts or prompted, the strangers may 
present their views and opinions on the subject in question, they may make remarks 
referring to the questions, the interviews or the respondent, they may even begin 
discussions and quarrels in connection with some of the problems taken up in the 
interview’.45  
 
This poses the question of how to interpret the findings: whose opinions are the subject 
of research - the individual, or the group? 
 Jan Lutynska observes that in later studies conducted by IFiS in the 1970s, 
researchers found that different answers were given by respondents according to the 
location of interviews.  Lutynska concludes that in general, a home atmosphere was more 
conducive to the expression of private opinions (especially on political issues) whereas 
in a work environment, participants were likely to concur with what they perceived were 
the ‘official’ positions on these topics. 
 
Summary 
 This paper has demonstrated that the main methodological issues confronting the 
opinion pollsters in communist political systems were directly related to the political 
atmosphere which pertained there.  Essentially, respondents’ refusals to participate in 
polls were manifest in terms both of avoiding taking part in polling interviews, and by 
answering ‘Don’t Know’ at strategic points within the interview.  Generally, respondents 
attached a low value to the efficacy of political opinion polls, and the motivation to take 
part, especially in periods where traditionalist-Marxist-Leninists were dominant within 
the key political institutions of the state, was low.  This lack of  public co-operation in 
polls was summarized by Lutynska: 
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 “...they are afraid, do not believe in the anonymity of the survey, believe that this is a 
‘waste of time’, ‘makes no sense’, will change nothing’, ‘is of use of nobody’...[or] would 
be doctored-up and used for propaganda purposes”.46 
 
Furthermore, the absence of political tolerance, and rights of free expression inclined 
many respondents to avoid making public utterances on the political set-up, government 
leadership, and current affairs, for fear of retribution by the state.  Instead, where citizens 
felt compelled to take part in political surveys, they were likely to disguise their real 
opinions if they feel that these did not correspond with the official issue-positions as 
reported in the mass media, or else stated that they did not have an opinion.  This was 
particularly likely in polling institutions associated with the state.  Response rates were 
also variable.  Consequently those who did participate in polls were unlikely to be 
representative of the full population, and the polls themselves to be unreliable indicators 
of the state of public opinion. 
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